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THE VIABILITY OF ARAB GULF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT·: 
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
OF LINK.AGES VERSUS SIZE EFFECTS 
INTRODUCTION. 
The mechanism. by which exports could .act as an « engine of growth 
(or leading sector) and the determinants of the overall impact of an 
export stimulation on the economy have been well discussed in the lite-
rature (1). In the classic situation of staples, exports contributed to 
economic growth directly (through direct contributions to Gross Domestic 
Product-GDP), and indirectly through contributions to GDP per medium 
of spread (or carry-over) effects ('2). 
Since oil revenues in the middle east accrue, for all practical pur-
pos61', solely to the host governments and in addition have very few 
linkages to the domestic economy, their impact on development largely 
depends on when and how they are spent. As with the classic case of 
staples, we can conceptualize two major impacts on economic develop-
ment: a direct one through the government allocation process-for con-
sumption, investment or defense, and an indirect one over time where the 
general increase in non-oil gross domestic product stemming from earlier 
government allocations spreads through the economy. 
This indirect contribution to growth embraces Hirschman-type linka-
ges (8) and can broadly be considered as a sequence of muWplier-accele-
rator mechanisms whereby increases in non-oil Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) augment demand for various sectoral-manufacturing, services, 
distribution-outputs. Theoretically, indirect contributions (or spread ef-
fects) can continue to accrue long after some export stimulus has occurred. 
The overall impact of an export stimulus on the economy ha.a many 
determinants including technology, the propensity to import, the extent 
to which investment opportunities generated are accepted domestically, 
the ability to attract foreign factors and so on. 
(1) G. W. BERTRAM « Eeonomie Growth in Canadian Industry>, Canadian Journal 
of Eoonomios and Political Soienoe (May 19&31); and G. W. BEBll'RA.M, «The Relevanee 
of the Canadian Wheat Boom in Canadian Economie Growth >, Canadian J O'Urnal of 
E <Xl'TW'Tn,W ( 1973). 
(2) M. M. ME'l'WALLY and H: U. TA:MASCBXE, « Oil Exports and Economic; Growth 
in the Middle East>, Kyklos (1980), pp. 499-500. 
(8) Of. A. 0. Hm.scHMAN, The Strategy of Economic Deveropment (New Haven, 
Conn: Yale University Press, 1958). 
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Obviously, ~either jhe timing P!ittern exhibited by, nor the relative 
sizes of; exports'· direet and indirect contributions to growth need to be 
fixed and could conceivably vary between subperiods, especially over long 
periods of economic development.· Provided that investment opportunities 
generated by the growth of the export sector are exploited, the model 
predicts that economic growth will be a process of diversificatioo about 
an export base. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine one aspect of the role played 
by government expeditures in the Gulf States, the impact of government 
expenditures on the development of a diversified industrial base. Have 
the Gulf countries been able to diversify around their export bases directly, 
through increases in government expenditures Y or has the process of 
industrial growth stemmed largely from indirect or ·spread effects Y Has 
this process been uniform throughout the region or has it varied from 
country to country and from time period to time period Y Based on this 
analysis several implications are drawn for. the future prospects of in-
dustrialization in the region. 
RECENT TRENDS. 
Because total GDP in the Gulf States is so greatly affected by 
developments in the oil sector, non-oil GDP is undoubtedly the best nume-
rator for measuring progress towards industrial diversification. Domestic 
absorption-total expenditures is also affected by movements in oil prices 
and revenues, but because governments can smooth out expenditures more 
than they can export receipts it is also les.s affected by developments in 
the oil sector. 
Using these measures as a basis of comparison (Tables 1 ·and 2) 
several notable trends stand out : 
1. If industrialization is judged in terms of diversification (Table 1), 
the greatest gains have been made by the UAE, Oman, and Qatar. 
During the 1974-85 each of these countries experienced substantial 
increases in the ratio of manufacturing output to non-oil GDP. 
2. Despite fairly healthy increases in industrial output, Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, actuall.Y experienced fairly dramatic 
decreases in the share of manufacturing to non-oil GDP. In each 
case by 1985 their manufacturing sectors accounted for about one 
half amount of GDP relative to 1974. 
3. In general, therefore, the overall pattern for Gulf states is one 
of countries with relatively low initial levels of industrial diversifi-
cation experiencing the greatest progress towards this end. In con-
trast, countries with relatively advanced states of industrial diversi-
fication actually regressed during the period 'lll1der consideration. 
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TABLE 1. - Structural Chooge in the Arab World: Industrial Production. 
(percent of non-oil/mineral GDP) 
Cown,try 1.S74 1975 :£976 1.S77 1978 1979 
Oil Eronomiea 
UAE 4.97 2.84 3.18 6.70 7.89 7.94 
Bahrain 30.74 3>1.87 17.70 14.76 13.55 . 19.12 
Saudi Arabia 24.37 21.26 15.02 12.25 10.15 10.75 
Oman 1.121 0.89 1.17 1.62 1.88 2.02 
Qatar 4.96 8.11 9.67 7.77 8.47 11.27 
Kuwait 21.59 19.17 17.74 15.61 16.31 24.65 
Iraq 131.06 13i.75 11.75 16.69 14.48 13.35 
Libya 4.79 4.73 5.32 6.15 5.17 5.70 
N O'll-oil E ()()'1U)mie8 
Egypt 17 .231 17.41 15.37 14.46 14.40 15.42 
Algeria 15.46 14.05 15.47 14.53' 13.98 16.40 
Jordan 12.56 13.41 12.38 11.77 11.721 12.97 
PDR Yemen 17.13 10.01 11.18 12.91 13.14 10.55 
Yemen Arab Rep 5.67 5.29 4.71 4.00 5.10 5.67 
Tunisia 11.12 9.79 10.64 IC>.71 11.55 12.42 
Sudan 8.63 9.18 8.44 8.19 7.46 6.69 
Somalia 6.84 5.00 6.49 7.04 5.80 5.79 
Morocco 17.91 18.20 17.46 17.36 17.64 17.60 
Mauritania 6.09 5.54 5.45 6.02 6.44 6.72 
Coom,try 1980 1981 1:981 1988 1984 1985 
Oil EC011C1nieB 
UAE 10.72 15.82 16.8-0 16.98 17.78 17.01 
Bahrain 21.16 19.78 14.21 14.00 131.56 13.91 
Saudi Arabia 13.10 14.52 11.22 10.86 11.81 12.32 
Oman 1.00 2.66 3.33 4.95 5.71 5.14 
Qatar 10.04 13.13 10.99 11.48 13.44 12.47 
Kuwait 16.27 12.29 11.92 11.67 11.32 12.42 
Iraq 11.14 9.29 9.82 9.66 12.56 12.56 
Libya 6.06 5:65 9.00 6.27 7.37 7.47 
N0'11-oi1 Economies 
Egypt 14.78 14.98 15.2'2 15.28 15.28 15.28 
Algeria 14.56 12.48 12.57 13>.10 13.38 13.54 
Jordan 13.46 14.73 14.49 12.75 13.80 12.77 
PDR Yemen 11.98 11.47 11.60 12.18 12.21 11.29 
Yemen Arab Rep 5.80 6.32 6.70 7.15 7.40 7.fYT 
Tunisia 13.46 13.54 12.70 12.60 13.26 13.42 
Sudan 5.91 5.78 5.49 7.04 9.57 9.30 
Somalia 5.80 5.4& 5.57 5.73 5.88 6.02 
Morocco 18.00 18.51 16.93 17.60 17.42 17.40 
Mauritania 6.70 6.29 7.09 7.14 5,61 5.77 
Note: Computed from data in Arab Monetary Fund, Natwiial Income AcOO'Unts, 1974-198$. 
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TABLE 2. - Sfr·uctural fJhange in the Arab WorlcZ: Industrial Production. 
(pereent of domestie absorption) 
C()'IJ,ntry 1974 1975 :£976 19n 1978 1979 
Oil Economies 
UAE 3.04 1.71 2.02 4.211 4.95 4.82 
Bahrain 21.74 29.20 lS.14 13.17 13i.22 16.51 
Saudi Arabia 17.55 14.06 9.39 7.28 5.66 6.01 
Oman 0.47 0.35 0.58 0.83 1.00 1.11 
Qatar 5.30 7.06 6.52 4.52 5.44 7.26 
Kuwait 7.07 7.95 9.37 11.17 11.27 18.78 
Iraq na na na na 9.25 7.96 
Libya 2.53 2.54 3.10 3.57 3.03 3.17 
Non-oil Economies 
Egypt 15.15 14.39 13'.37 12.42 11.82 ll.2i4: 
Algeria 10.03 9.04 10.22 9.11 9.12 11.53 
Jordan 8.18 8.03 7.48 7.01 7.33 7.60 
PDR Yemen 10.90 6.317 6.50 7.01 7.48 6.16 
Yemen Arab Rep 4.37 3.93 3.11 31.06 3.06 3o.38 
Tunisia 9.89 8.43 9.19 9.03 9.91 10.76 
Sudan 8.16 8.00 7.64 7.64 6.89 8.20 
Somalia 5.53 4.32 5.66 6.13' 5.07 4.64 
Moroeeo 15.70 15.11 13.98. 131.73 15.12 15.07 
Mauritania 4.14 3.55 3'.22 3.78 4.31 4.54 
C01J,ntry 1980. 1981 1'988 1989 1984 1985 
Oil E wnomies 
UAE 6.75 10.32 11.64 12.18 13.20 12.93 
Bahrain 18.62 19.62 12.2-0 12:38 11.51 11.78 
Saudi Arabia 7.43 8.35 6.26 6.36 9.93· 7.37 
Oman 1.01 1.47 1.78 2.88 3.41 3.73 
Qatar 8.06 9.98 7.48 9.07 16.53J 11.96 
Kuwait 10.55 7.70 7.38 6.49 6.46 6.15 
Iraq 6.58 4.95 5.86 na na 8.35 
Libya 31.31 2.90 3.83 3.92 5.13 5.53 
Non-oil Economies 
Egypt 11.51 11.42 11.82 11.92 11.61 11.77 
Algeria 10.25 8.90 9.14 9.78 10.41 10.83 
Jordan 8.61 8.57 • 8.54 8.00 8.94 8.58 
PDR Yemen 6.31 5.8'2 6.25 6.78 6.71 6.04 
Yemen Arab Rep 3.48 3.79 4.21 4.79 5.21 5.16 
Tunisia 11.24 10.94 10.13 10.28 10.58 11.2'4 
Sudan 5.41 5.38 5.08 6.14 8.86 8.47 
Somalia 4.75 4.90 4.64 4.80 4.77 4.94 
Moroeeo 15.54 15.317 14.28 15.55 14.97 15.31 
Mauritania 4.42 42~ 4.40 4.43 3.71 3,,84 
Note: Oomputed from data in Arab Monetary Fund, National. bicome Accounts, 1974-1985. 
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4. In contrast to the Gulf States, other Arab countries experienced 
little change in their manufacturing output relative to non-oil GDP. 
In other words these countries experienced increases in manufacturing 
output over time in roughly the same proportion as in their non-
man ufacturing activity. 
In terms of manufacturing 's share of domestic absorption (Table 2): 
1. With the p-ossible exception of Kuwait, the Gulf countries expe-
rienced similar, albeit less dramatic movements in industrial diver-
sification. 
2. Because of the fall in government expenditures after the 1982, 
the decline in Saudi .Arabia's, Bahrain's, and Kuwait's manufacturing 
sector relative to domestic absorption leveled off and stabilized some-
what. 
3. .A.gain, considerable stability has set in the other Arab countries 
with only several major declines-Egypt, PDR Yemen, and gains--
Libya, Tunisia . 
.A. slightly different picture develops if we rank countries in terms 
of their relative degree of industrial development. For this purpose, factor 
analysis was used to create an index of industrial diversification. This 
index consists essentially of the country scores on a factor which in turn 
is the weighted average of four measures of industrialization. 
The first two, the share of manufacturing in non-oil gdp and absorp-
tion were examined above. The second two measures, the ratio of manu-
facturing to distributive and to service activities are designed to capture 
the alleged c over-development ~ of non-manufacturing sectors in the oil 
states. If the oil states did in fact have a relative expansion in non-
manufacturing activities, we would expect to see a number of these 
countries experiencing relatively better (compared to Tables 1 and 2) in-
dustrial performance. 
On the basis of this index (Table 3): 
1. The relative declines of Bahrain, Saudi .Arabia, and Kuwait are 
again apparent, as are the improvements in industrial diversification 
in the U.A.E, and Qatar. Using this index, Oman's perfonn.ance is 
now relatively poor. 
2. The leveling off in recent years of the fall in the industrial 
diversification index for Bahra.l'n, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait is most 
likely indicative of a proportional contraction of services/distribu-
tional activities, and in particular construction, rather than a major 
expansion in manufacturing. 
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TABLE 3. - Re"lative 1ndustriaUzation in the Arab World, 1974, 1985. 
(faetor seores) 
Cown,try 1974 1975 r97·6 1977 1978 1979 
0•1 Economies 
UAE --0.98 -1.18 -1.41 --0.89 --0.73 --0.86 
Bahrain 1.98 2.62 1.00 0.95 0.80 1.28 
Saudi Arabia 1.70 1.12 0.73 0.33 -0.19 --0.25 
Oman -1.52 -1.59 -1.92 -2.06 -2.06 -1.73 
Qatar --0.95 --0.31 --0.34 --0.85 --0.71 --0.30 
Kuwait 0.41 0.05 0.58 0.83 0.89 2.22 
Iraq na na na na 0.91 0.36 
Libya -1.14 --0.99 -1.14 -1.00 -1.23 -1.00 
N<m-oil Eoonomies 
Egypt 0.89 0.99 1.37 1.33 1.17 0.64 
Algeria 0.62 0.33 1.16 0.94 0.79 0.90 
Jordan --0.20 --0.17 --0.05 0.04 0.07 --0.10 
PDR Yemen 0.63' --0.32 -0.10 0.25 0.45 --0.36 
Yemen Arab Rep -0.67 --0.59 --0.85 -1.11 -1.12 -1.06 
Tunisia --0,03 --0.01 0.26 0.313 0.52 0.41 
Sudan --0.12 0.07 0.10 --0.07 --0.30 --0.28 
Somalia -0.Pfl --0.26 0.07 --0.19 --0.32 -o.61 
Moroeeo 0.67 Q.89 1.41 1.62 1.82 1.36 
Mauritania --0.92 -0.65 --0.97 -0.84 --0.75 -0.60 
Coontry 1980 1981 1'98S 1983 1984 1985 
Oi'l Economies 
UAE --0.31 0.63 1.23 1.16 1.22 1.12 
Bahrain 1.87 1.81 0.79 0.61 0.23 0.43 
Saudi Arabia 0.23 0.52i --0.10 --0.27 0.09 o.oi 
Oman -2.07 -2.94 -2.02 -1.78 -1.77 -1.74 
Qatar -0.;>}7 0.09 --0.24 0.03 0.92 0.59 
Kuwait 0.49 -025 --0.16 --0.3'7 -0.59 -0.35 
Iraq -0.15 --0.64 --0.41 na na. --0.01 
Libya -1.16 -1.31(} -1.07 -1.23 -1.08 --0.97 
Non-oil Economies 
Egypt 0.95 0.91 1.31() 1.17 1.00 1.04 
Algeria 0.85 0.53 0.71 0.74 0.07 0.85 
Jordan 0.23 0.48 0.68 0.22 0.35 0.12 
PDR Yemen --0.04 --0.10 0.07 0.18 0.07 .;.....().19 
Yemen Arab Rep -1.00 --0.89 --0.88 --0.~3 --0.84 -1.01 
Tunisia 0.77 0.75 0.71 0.63 0.63 0.82 
Sudan --0.77 --0.76 -0.91 --0.69 --0.35 -0.28 
Somalia --0.3-0 --0.67 --0.82 -0.95 -1.05 -1.14 
Moroceo 1.62 1.62 1.83 2.08 1.72 2.07 
Mauritania --0.83 --0.79 --0.70 --0.70 -1.34 -1.39 
Note: Based on faetor analysis using four measures of industrializatfon: manufacturing percent of 
non-oil GDP, domestic absorptiooi, total serviees and total distributfon. 
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3. Using the diversification index, several of the non-oil economies: 
Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco had major improvements in 
their industrial diversification efforts. 
In sum, all three measures of industrial progress in the Gulf countries 
paint a similar picture: several countries, the UAE and Qatar, have been 
fairly successful in diversifying their economies. Despite large absolute 
increases in industrial product, by 1985 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, 
were considerably more dependent on non-industrial activities than they 
were at the time of the revolution in oil prices. 
SPREAD VERSUS LINKAGE EFFECTS. 
For policy purposes, it is of some interest to determine the factors 
responsible for these movements. Where improvements in industrial diver-
sification largely the response to spread effectEr-increases in industrial 
demand created by an expanding non-oil sector of the economy Y Or were 
they caused by more direct linkages aSS-Ociated with expanding govern-
ment expenditures? 
It should be noted that particularly in the case of the oil economies, 
government expenditures could have either a positive or negative impact. 
If government expenditures go direetly into investment in or the pur~ 
chasing of industrial activities, the effect will be positive. If instead, the 
expansion of the public sector is into areas of a largely non-industrial 
nature, the impact may be negative as these activities grow relative to 
industry. 
The methodology used to measure these effeets oonsisted of the fol-
lowing steps: 
1. A factor analysis was made to determine the main structural 
features in the Arab economies. Included in the analysis were mea-
sures of industrial diversification, service and distributional activities, 
and imports. 
2. To capture the effects of non-oil development on Gulf state in-
dustrial· diversification efforts, manufacturing/distribution and ma-
nufacturing/construction were included in the analysis in addition 
to the share of manufacturing in absorption and in non-oil GDP. 
3. Since interest was primarily in the impact of government expen-
ditures and/or· output on fndtistrial diversification, several measures 
of both factors were included in the analysis. Public sector expendi-
tures and non-oil output were both 'depicted· in terms of their pro-
portion of: (a) absorption, and (b)· Gross Domestic product. 
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4. The over-all influence of both government expenditures and output 
effects were determined by the correlation of these variables on the 
industrial factor. To gain some idea of the changing nature of this 
impact three years were examined: (a) 1976 a period after which 
the first effects of the oil price shock had time to be reflected, 
(b} W80 a period by which the longer term effects of the 1973/74 
oil price changes were reflected, and (c) 1985 a date by which some 
of the effects of the oil price declines were making themselves felt. 
5. To determine the linkage and spread effects on industrial diver-
sification in our sample countries, individual factor scores were com-
puted. AB in Table 3 above, these factor scores depict the industrial 
environment, and their values reflect each country's position in the 
spectrum of Arab world industrial diversification. 
6. The factors scores obtained in step 5 reflect the relative success 
or failure of each country at achieving industrial diversification, 
given the presence of linkage and spread effects. To determine the 
relative impact of each effect, separate factor scores were computed 
by (a) leaving out the output variable while retaining the government 
expenditure terms, (b) omitting the government expenditure terms, 
while including the output or spread factors. 
7. Finally, the factor scores in these final two exercises were com-
pared with those in step 5 to determine the relative strength of the 
two effects. 
The results (Tables 4-6) of these exercises show several interesting patterns: 
1. In the initial year, 1976 (Table 4), the four manufacturing 
variables loaded on a common factor. This factor also included 
one aspect of the service sector-the ratio of services to domestic 
absorption. · 
2. At this time, the spread effects as depicted by output (non-oil 
GDP) to absorption appear fairly strong (a standardized regr~on 
coefficient of 0.60 on industry). · 
3. The direct effects of government expenditure, however, appear 
fairly weak (standardized regression coefficients of 0.19 and 0.14 for 
government expenditures/absorption and government expenditures 
GDP respectively). 
4. In general the oil economies were achieving net positive effects 
at this point in time with spread effects predominating. On the other 
hand the non oil economies had mixed effects with negative spread 
effects predominating for Jordan, PDR Yemen, Yemen Arab Repu-
blic, and Egypt. Positive linkage effects predominated for the rest 
of the non-oil economies. 
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TABLE 4. - Arab States, Relativl!) Strength of Government Expenditures 
·u;n,d Sectoral Output on Industrial Dweirsification, 1976. 
(Standard Regression. ,(Joeffie~ents) 
Oblique Faetor Pattern 
Variable Faetor 1 Faetor 2 Faetor 3 Faetor 4 Faetor 5 industry serv /import distrib output/govex gov ex 
man/abs 1.01* 0.05 0.16 0.05 0.01 
man/gdp 0.00* 0.18 0.1(} 0.03 0.12 
man/dist 0.87* -0.07· -0.26 -0.04 (}.10 
man/eonst 0.75* -0.14 :--0.07 0.48 0.17 
OUTPUT/.J.BS 0.60* -0.46 0.16 0.14 -0.31 
eerviee/abs 0.59* 0.64* -0.12 -0.21 -0.23 
imp/abs 0.04 0.9'3* 0.28 0.16 0.06 
imp/gdp --0.18 0.88* 0.19 0.11 0.20 
serviee/gdp 0.21 0.77* -0.2.5 --0.27 -0.()3 
dist/a be 0.25 -0.02 1.01* --0.09 -0.18 
dist/gdp -0.16 0.17 0.88* -0.18 0.08 
OUTPUT/GDP 0.23 0.01 -0.24 0.93* 0.00 
GOVEX/.J.BS 0.1'9 --0.17 0.05 -0.75* 0.68* 
GOVEX/GDP 0.14 0.15 -0.11 o.os. 0.93* 
Faetor Seores 
Faetor 1 Faetor 1 Faetor 1 IX>minant Country 
manu.faeturing minus output minus govt Effeet 
expenditure 
Ou Eoonomies 
UAE _:.1,43 -1.42 (=) -1.40 (=) 
Bahrain 1.01 1.04 (=) 1.03 (=) 
Saudi Arabia 0.75 0.3~ (+) . 0.80 <=> spread + Oman -1.76 -1.68 (=) -1.70 (=) 
Qatar -0.15 
-0.50 <+> -1.37 (+) spread + 
Kuwait na na 1.10 
Iraq na na na 
Libya -0.64 
-1.06 <+> -1.02 <+) spread + Algeria 0.37 0.57 (-:) 0.76 (-) linkage -
N O'll-Oil E CO'TW11f,ies 
Jordan 0.05 0.41 (-) 0.02 (=) spread 
PDR Yemen --0.30 0;09 (-) --0.09 (-) spread 
YAR· -,1.16 -0.88 (-) -1.07 (-) spread 
Egypt 1.60 1.82 (-) 1.45 <+> spread 
Tunisia 0.64 0.35 <+> 0.17 (+) linkage+ 
Sudan 0.11 0,09 (=) 
-0.24 <+> linkage+ 
Somalia -0.15 --OJJ2 (-) 
-0.30 <+> linkage+ 
Moroeeo 1.69 1.40 <+> 1.52 <+> linkage+ 
Mauritania -0.64 
-0.71 <+> -0.85 <+> linkage+ 
Note: ( ) refers to the impaet o:I! output 
( eolumn 3) on industrial diversifieation. 
(eolumn 2~ and government expenditures 
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. . At the height of the oil. boom, 19'80. (Table 5}, the situation had 
changed considerably: · · 
1. The factor analysis (top of Table 5) indicated that spread effects 
were likely to be positive for the group as a whole, while the linkage 
effects were probably insignificant for most countries. 
2. An examination of factor scores however, indicates quite the re-
verse. While a number of the non-oil economies experienced positive 
spread effects (and negative spread effects for the oil economies}, 
the predominant effoots on industrial diversification were produced 
by direct linkages to government expenditures. 
3. In general, all of the non-oil economies where linkage effects were 
present, experienced negative impacts on industrial diversification 
from increaSled government expenditures. In contrast, all of the non-oil 
economies experiencing linkage effects were able to achieve higher 
levels of industrial diversification thorough · expanded government 
. expenditures. 
Finally after several years of declining oil revenues, the situation had 
again changed (Table 6) to the extent that: · 
1. There was now a return of spread effects in a number of 
countries as the dominant factor affecting the pattern of industrial 
diversification. 
2. The demarcation between oil and non-oil economies was much less 
defined on the bases of linkage and spread effect patterns. Individual 
countries in each group had both a predominance of either linkage 
or spread effects, and of different signs for each effect. 
3. The magnitudes of each effect also appeared (the differences in 
scores between column one •and columns two and three to be somewhat 
less than in the past, perhaps indicating a weakening of these effects). 
Summing up the results of the factor analysis, it appears that until 
quite recently the oil and non-oil economies experienced fundamentally 
different patterns of industrial diversification. In large part, industrial 
diversification was retard in the oil ~onomies through the dominance of 
negative linkage effects associated with rapidly expanding government 
expenditures. Apparently these expenditures had their greatest impact on 
the service, distribution, and construction sectors, with relatively little 
direct stimulus to industry. 
At the same time these economies were not capable of achieving spread 
effects sufficient to offset the forces initiated by an expanding public 
sector. Those countries (The UAE and Qatar) that were able to make 
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TABLE 5. - Arab States, Relative Strength of Government Expemdlitures 
and Sectoral 01ttput on Industrial Diversifwatiun, 1980. 
(Standard Regression Coefficients) 
Oblique Faetor Pattern 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Fa.etor 8 Factor 4 Factor 5 industry imports services govt expend distrib 
man/dist 1.00* 0.00 0.16 --0.04 --0.38 
man/gdp 0.97* 0.31 0.09 0.10 0.03 
man/abs 0.93* 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.17 
man/const 0.82* --0.19 --0.24 0.06 0.08 
imp/gdp 0.04 1.00* --0.01 --0.05 0.10 
imp/abs 0.31 0.87* -0.03 --0.12 0.29 
OUTPUT/ABS 0.43 --0.57 0.00 --0.18 0.42 
serviee/gdp --0.01 0.11 0.95* --0.04 --0.15 
service/abs 0.26 -0.18 0.93* --0.09 0.10 
OUTPUT/GDP 0.30 -0.22 --0.50* --0.35 --0.14 
GOVEX/ABB 0.00 -0.16 0.22 1.00* 0.12 
GOVEX/GDP 0.19 0.03 --0.30 0.99* --0.10 
dist/abs 0.11 0.09 -0.01 --0.01 0.95* 
dist/gdp --0.215 0.44 -0.04 0.08 0.77* 
Factor Scores 
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Dominant Country 
manufacturing minus output minus govt Effect 
expenditure 
oa EOO'TW'mies 
UAE --0.76 --0.63 (-) --0.50 (-) linkage -
Bahrain 1.80 1.75 (=) 1.75 (=) 
Saudi Arabia --0.1;31 0.00 (-) 0.3·0 (-) linkage -
Oman -1.94 -1.89. (=) -1.93 (=) 
Qatar --0.30 0.35 (=) --0.29 (=) 
Kuwait 0.45 0.60 (-) 0.78 (-) linkage -
Iraq ---0.50 -0.37 (-) --0.21 (-) linkage -
Libya -1.16 -1.11 (=) -1.02 (-) linkage -
Algeria 0.31 0.41 (-) 0.60 (-) linkage -
Non-Oil Economies 
Jordan 0.23 0·.18 (=) 0.11 <+> linkage+ 
PDR Yemen na na 0.09 
YAR --0.85 --0.931 (+) -,-1.10 (+) linkage+ 
Egypt 0.99 1.03 (;;=) 0.86 (+) linkage+ 
Tunisia 0.95 0.89 <+> 0.83 (+) linkage+ 
Sudan -0.43 -0.65 (+) ---0.91 <+> . linkage+ 
Somalia 0.01 
--0.ll <+> --0.39 <+> linkage+ 
Moroeeo 1.81 1.82 (=) 1.85 (=) 
Mauritania --0.48 
--0.&2 <+> --0.73 <+> 
Note: ( ) refers to the impact of output 
(column 3) on industrial diversificat~on. 
(column 21 and government expenditures 
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TABLE 6. - Arab ·States, Relative Strength o-f Government Exp&ruiJitu.res 
amd Sectoral Output on Industrial Divm-sification, 1985. 
(Stan.dara: Regression Coefficients) 






































































Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
industry imports/ output distribut 
-0.20 0.17 -0.14 
0.18 -0.18 0.11 
0.16 OJl'l 0.12 
-0.16 -0.19 -o.:n 
I.01 • -0.12 0.05 
o.86• 0.10 -0.49 
0.81• 0.31 0.08 
0.06 0.92*. 0.16 



















































































Note: ( ) refers to the impact of output (column 2) and government expenditures 
(column 3) on industrial diversification. 
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significant gains in industrial diversification appear to have done so 
through developing positive spread effects at key points in time (Qatar 
mid 1970s and the U.A.E mid 1980s), while avoiding negative linkage 
effects at others (Qatar early 1980s, U.A.E mid 1970s). 
CONCLUSIONS. 
The findings presented above are largely consistent with earlier staple 
theories of development in that industrial diversification in oil based 
economies in the .Arab world developed along lines fundamentally dif-
ferent than that experienced by the non-oil economies of the region. On 
the other hand, it appears that the general absence in the oil economies 
until fairly recently of significant spread effects has made the industriali-
zation process much less predictable than in those countries experiencing 
clas&c patterns of staple development. The large role played by the go-
vernments in the oil economies has resulted in the predominance of discre-
tionary elements over market prices as the chief factor responsible for 
the allocation of resources . 
.AB noted, the arrival of a viable and self sufficient manufacturing 
sector industrial structure has long been viewed as the prime objective 
of the .Arab Gulf states, as the key to successful economic diversification, 
and as the main assurance of continuing and self-ErUStaining economic 
growth. Since the large increases in oil revenues in the 1970s Gulf govern-
ments have directed a substantial portion of their huge development 
outlays towards the creation of an adequate industrial infrastructure and 
the establishment of certain major state and joint public/private public 
heavy industries. 
It is clear from the patterns described above, however, that any way 
one looks at it, industrial diversification has proceeded at rates lower 
than anticipated, or at least lower than at feasible rates, and in some 
cases the process has even been reversed. 
Before any final evaluations are made of the Gulf states' attempts 
at industrialization, however, it is important that two basic factors be 
recognized which render any precise objective analysis of the Gulf expe-
rience in industrialization difficult if not impossible at the present time. 
The first factor is the total time span from the first steps in modern 
industry to the present day, which has been too short to allow the industrial 
sector to become firmly established as yet, and thus the effect of industrial 
development on the economic and social' growth in the region cannot yet 
be quantified. The rupture which occurred in the productive processes 
of Gulf society in the transition from pre-oil export dominated economies 
was total, in that there is not direct connection. or relationship between 
the introduction of modern industry to the Gulf states and the historical 
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relations of production in the Gulf. Consequently the process of industria-
lization has depended 'on external rather than internal dynamics (4). 
As Abdulla Hamad al-Moajil has noted : 
The fact that industrialization has been an external rather than in-
ternal process for the societies of the Gulf resulted in a false under-
standing of the true meaning of industrialization based on a confusion 
between the theory o industrialization in its broadest sense and the 
practical process of installing industrial plant through turnkey con-
tracts with foreign construction and engineering companies. Factories 
set up in the Gulf on this turnkey basis belong to the region in a 
graphical sense, but the existence and continued functioning of the 
factories is dependent on external factors. In other words, the process 
of industrialization in the Gulf has tended to be a geographical rather 
than an historical phenomenon (5). 
The second factor preventing an objective assessment of Gulf in-
dustrialization is the absence of a comprehensive strategy for development 
on the regional level to provide a definition of the status and role of 
manufacturing industry within the overall process of social and eeonomic 
development. Again as observed by al-Moajil although each individual 
state in the region has formulated and instituted its own development 
plans, whether on the basis of declared five year plans or a more general 
long term policy there has been little effort until recently to achieve any 
coordination between neighboring states (6). 
Thus while the success of each state in achieving its self declared 
targets has given the semblance of overall development even in terms 
of industrial growth, the actual growth of industry in each state has 
not been related to a regional strategy aimed at maximum exploita-
tion of regional resources and markets. In the absence of a coor-
dinated regiona'l strategy, excessive capacity was installed in some 
sectors of industry, while none was installed in others. This im-
balance coupled with the limited size of markets available within 
any single state, meant that there was no possibility for the growth 
of integrated industries, so long as development took place at state 
level rather than in a regional context (7). 
The completion of the infrastructure stage of development together 
with the decline in oil revenues has reduced the options open to govern-
(4) Abdulla Hamad AirMOAJIL, «Industrialization in the Arab Gulf States>, .drab 
Gulf Industry (January 1986), p. 9. 
(11) Ibid., p.9. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid., pp. 9.10. 
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ments in the region and actually make· forecasts of future patterns of 
industrial diversification easier to· anticipate than in the past. In general 
all of the Gulf states are moving from public sector led growth and over-
dependence on oil to private sector initiatives and diversified production 
base. The general oqjectives of .the. evolvi]lg development strategy in the 
region include (8): 
1. diversifying the region's economic structure in order to minimize 
its exposure to external factors and allow a bigger share of the 
industrial sectors; 
2. the developip.ent. and optimal utilization of the region's human 
resources, increasing human productivity and enhancing the relation 
between reward and productivity; · 
3. increasing the value added of local natural resources through 
downstream processing; 
4. meeting the local .market demand in as much as possible with an 
. outlook toward increasing exports by capitalizing . on the region's 
relative advantage in certain produ~ts; 
5. creating an industrial and technological base that is self sustaining 
and is reasonably independent from the oil sector; and 
6. working toward a geographically balanced development of the 
region in order to enhance regional cooperation. 
As .Azzam notes : 
The fir&t stage of economio development in the region is almost com-
pleted, the state lasted from the early 70s still the early 80s and 
made use of. increasing oi.l revenues to help build the basic infra-
structure both physical; human and financial-airports, sports, roads, 
schools, housing universities, .hospitals, te'lecommunications and finan-
cial institutions. The second· development phase has actually started. 
It involves a largerparticipation of the private sector and relies 
more on attracting foreign investors as joint venture partners inclu-
ding the transfer of appropriate technology management skills and 
international distribution system. 
The outcome of this process will be the diversification into industry that 
has long alluded the Gulf States. 
National Sermrity .Affairs, Naval, Postgraduate Sohoo·Z, Monterey, California. 
RoBERT E. Lo-ONEY 
(8) Henry .A..zu.M, The Gulf Eco'IWYTties m Transiim (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1988), p. 3. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine one aspect of the role played by govern-
ment expenditures in the Gulf States, the impact of government expenditures on 
the development of a. diversified industrial base. 
Based on a. factor analysis of the structure of the twenty-one Arab economies, 
it appears that until quite reeently the oils a.nd non-oil economies experieneed funda· 
mentally different patterns of industrial diversifica.tion. In large part, industrial 
diversifica.tion was retard in the oil economies through the dominance of negative 
linkage effects associated with rapidly expanding government expenditures. Appa-
rently these expenditures had their greatest impact on the service, distribution, and 
construction eeetors, with relatively little direct stimulus to industry. At the same 
time these economies were not capable of achieving spread effects sufficient to offset 
the forces initiated by an expanding public eootor. Those countries (The UAE and 
Qatar) that were able to make significant gains in industrial diversifica.tion appear 
to have done so through developing positive spread effects at key points in time 
(Qatar mid 1970s and the UAE mid 1980s), while a.voiding negative linkage effects 
at others (Qatar early 1980s, UAE mid 1970s). 
RIASSUNTO 
Le poasibiUta d• avuuppo industriale nel ·Golf<> Arabico: 
l'1importam.sa relatwa. degli effetti di oolfogamento e di quelli dimenaionali. 
Lo scopo dell<> studio e esamina.re un a.spetto del ruolo svolto dalle spese pubbliche 
negli Sta.ti del Golfo: l'effetto delle spese pubbliche sullo sviluppo di a.ttivita indu-
striali diversifies.ta. 
L'analiei dells. struttura delle ventuno economie a.rs.be, sembra rileva.re che fino 
a. pooo tempo fa. i Paesi produttori di petrolio e quelli non produttori hanno realizzato 
modelli fondamentalmente diversi di diversifica.zione induatriale. In genere la. diversi-
ficazione industria.le e in rita.rdo nei Pa.esi produttori di petrolio a. causa degli effetti 
negativi dovuti a.lla. rapids. eepansione delle apese pubbliche. Apparentemente tali spese 
ha.nno influenza.to principalmente il settore terziario, quello della. distribuzione e della 
costruzione stimola.ndo in misura rela.tivamente modesta l 'industria. Al teinpo stesso 
tali economie non sono riusc.ite ad ottenere effetti di propagazione eufficienti a contro-
bila.nciare le forze messe in moto dall 'espansione del settore pubblico. I Paesi (gli 
EA.U e il Qatar) che solo hanno potuto trli.rre vantaggio dalla diversificazione indu-
striale sembrano esserci riusciti stimolando gli effetti positivi di propagazione in alcuni 
periodi (il Qatar a.Ila meta degli a.nni '70 e gli EAU aJla metA degli a.nni '80') ed 
eliminando gli effetti negativi di collegamento in a.Itri periodi (il Qatar all 'inizio degli 
a.nni '80 e gli EAU aJla meta degi a.uni '70): 
